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RES JUDICATA: THE SHIELD BECOMES A SWORD.
PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF NEGLIGENCE BARS
RELITIGATION OF THAT ISSUE BY OTHER
PLAINTIFFS IN SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
BASED ON SAME ACCIDENT
A NUMBER of suits arising out of an airplane crash were instituted
against the air line in diverse jurisdictions and in one such Cali-
fornia action the defendant was adjudged negligent.' Thereafter,
in United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.,2 the Nevada District
Court held that the California adjudication estopped the air line
from relitigating the negligence issue.3 In so holding, the court
rejected the defense contention that since these plaintiffs had not
been parties to the previous action, the doctrine of "mutuality of
estoppel"4 prevented the application of res judicata. 5
"Wiener v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
2 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962).
3 In the instant case, 49 persons were killed when United's airliner collided with
a United States Air Force F-100-F jet fighter on April 21, 1958. Suits were filed in
11 different jurisdictions. United States v. United Air lines, Inc. represented the
claims of survivors of nine of these victims, consolidated for trial. The prior judg-
ment, trelied upon as an estoppel, Wiener v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701
(S.D. Cal. 1962) was an action brought by 24 other representatives of victims of the
collision.
The issue arose on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability only, as allowed by Fxn. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Of course the damages suffered
by each plaintiff remained to be completely litigated.
The United States, a party plaintiff in these actions, sued to recover from United
Air Lines the statutory compensation that it would be required to pay to the heirs
of government employees killed in the crash, and for subrogation in the event that
the verdicts rendered were in excess of the amounts that the United States would be
required to pay. 216 F. Supp. at 712-14.
'"On the principle that estoppels must be mutual, no person is entitled to take
advantage of a former judgment or decree, as decisive in his favor of a matter in
controversy, unless, being a party or in privy thereto, he would have been prejudiced
by it had the decision been the other way." 2 BLAcK, JUDGMENTS § 534 (2d ed. 1902).
This doctrine has been liberalized to some extent by allowing exceptions. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1908) (indemnitor-in.
demnitee relationship); Bernard v. Metropolis Land Co., 40 Nev. 89, 160 Pac. 811
(1916) (parties so closely related in interest as to constitute privity); Good Health
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937) (mutuality not
required if liability derivative from exculpated party).
The doctrine of res judicata embodies two main rules. First, it prevents a party
from relitigating the same cause of action against his opponent after a final judgment
has been rendered on that cause of action. Secondly, a final judgment is conclusive
as to issues of fact necessarily decided in the determination of that action before a
competent court. This aspect has been referred to as "collateral estoppel." 50 C.J.S.
Judgments § 592 (1947). Both segments are commonly called res judicata without
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The court applied the rationale of the leading case of Bernhard
v. Bank of America6 which held that a res judicata plea is appro-
priate where there is identity of issues, a final judgment on the
merits, and where the party against whom the plea is asserted had
been a party, or in privity with a party, to the previous action.7
Although the Bernhard decision effectuates the policy underlying
the res judicata principle, application of the Bernhard test raises
serious problems when, as in the present case, res judicata is asserted
offensively by one not a party to the previous action.9 Conse-
quently, there has been a marked judicial tendency to restrict the
doctrine to defensive use only.10 In addition, several commentators,
while approving Bernhard have urged that it be limited in applica-
tion. 1
Without question, the most serious objection to Bernhard is
the enigmatic problem raised by the multiple plaintiff anomaly.' 2
For example, in the present case forty-nine persons were killed. 3
Supposing that a separate action had been instituted on behalf of
each, what should be the result if the defendant had won the first
fifteen of these and had then lost number sixteen? Should the
distinguishing between them. In this note, the collateral estoppel aspect is of primary
importance and when the term res judicata is used, refers to that segment.
0 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). For a discussion of this case and an analysis
of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). For a defense of the
requirement of mutuality see Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 301 (1961).
7 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
8 It is generally stated that the doctrine of res judicata serves a dual purpose.
Of primary importance, it serves the general interest of the community in the
reduction of litigation and in the finality of judicial decisions. The doctrine also
serves a private interest, the right of the individual to be protected from a
multiplicity of suits and prosecutions. 2 FRsriN, JUDGMENTS § 626 (5th ed. 1925).
0 In the Bernhard case, a judgment rendered by the probate court accepting an
executor's account and ruling that certain monies were properly paid to the
executor by the bank was given conclusive effect when one of the beneficiaries of the
estate sued the bank for paying over the funds even though the bank (who as-
serted the former judgment) had not been a party to the prior action. It should be
noted that here res judicata was being used defensively.
1 Several jurisdictions have recognized defensive use of res judicata without
requirement of mutuality but have not gone so far as to allow offensive use. See,
e.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Tezak v. Cooper, 24 Ill. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960); De Polo v. Greig, 338
Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); Gammel v. Ernst : Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d
364 (1955). See cases collected in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952).
'
1 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 6, at 282. Comment, 18 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 565 (1941); 35
TExAs L. REv. 137 (1956).
12 See Currie, supra note 6, at 285-89.
10 216 F. Supp. at 712.
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remaining plaintiffs be allowed to assert res judicata on the basis of
the judgment in action sixteen? Incontestably, the literal language
of the Bernhard test requires such a result.' 4 Moreover, even if the
first verdict returned is for the plaintiff, it has been urged that, as
there is no guarantee that this verdict was not the one wrongly de-
cided, the anomaly still cannot be avoided.' 5
The danger of the inconsistent verdict is, in theory at least,
difficult to overcome. As a practical matter, however, the problem
is far from insurmountable and can be avoided by adopting the rule
that unless there has been an actual inconsistency of verdicts, res
judicata will be applied in proper cases. To adopt a contrary po-
sition and not allow the plea where there is a mere possibility of
inconsistent verdicts destroys the effectiveness of the principle.'0
True, there is no guarantee that the first action was not the one
wrongly decided, but by definition, a full and fair adjudication of
the issue is prerequisite to entertaining a plea of res judicata. In
any event, the objection here has no more merit than if it were
raised against the accepted doctrine of res judicata generally.'1 If
the issue has been fully and fairly litigated, the paper tiger of in-
consistent verdicts should not be a barrier to the rejection of the
requirement of mutuality of estoppel.
Several other objections have been raised against the Bernhard
rule. It has been argued that a party should be afforded the op-
portunity to contest the issue of his liability against every party
to whom he may be held liable, apparently in the hope that a later
court will arrive at a different result.' However, the objective of
the judicial process is to decide issues according to judicially de-
termined facts, and not to give a disappointed litigant the oppor-
1' The possibility of this anomalous situation has been urged as sufficient support
for limiting the Bernhard doctrine by not applying res judicata if there is more
than two injured plaintiffs. Currie, supra note 6, at 285-89.
I" Currie, supra note 6, at 289.
16 By definition, this limitation would automatically eliminate the possibility of
asserting res judicata if there were more than two injured parties. Hence, in all
mass disasters such as the present case, res judicata would be unavailable. There
would seem to be little justification for withholding the practical advantages of the
Bernhard decision in this situation because of mere possibility.
1 In any instance i which a prior judgment is said to be determinative of an
issue, there is no guarantee that the previous verdict was absolutely correct. This
fact has not prevented the courts from universally applying res judicata in the proper
cases when mutuality is present.
"Note, 57 HAIv. L. REv. 98, 105 (1943).
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tunity to continue disputing them. Once the defendant has had his
"day in court" on the issue, there would seem to be no injustice to
require that he be bound by that determination.
Furthermore, it has been urged that allowing many plaintiffs
to assert one judgment against the defendant would, by destroying
the incentive of parties to settle claims out of court, actually lead to
increased rather than reduced litigation.19 As a corollary to this
premise, it is argued that there is an element of unfairness in thus
depriving the defendant of an opportunity to compromise the
claims against him. The theory is that once one plaintiff has pro-
ceeded to litigation and has obtained a favorable verdict, all others
similarly situated, being assured of victory, would also litigate their
claims. Even assuming this to be true, the argument seems tenuous.
The time spent in litigating solely the issue of damages in numerous
cases does not equal the time consumed in fully litigating the issue
of liability in but a few cases. 20 Undoubtedly, adoption of the
Bernhard rule will affect the position of the parties with relation
to compromising the claims. However, the danger does not appear
to be that plaintiffs will refuse to compromise, but rather that the
defendant will be unfairly pressured into settling all claims and not
taking a chance in court. By going into court, the defendant can
win only one action; if he loses, he loses them all.21  However, ac-
cording to the suggested rule, if the defendant does go into court
and wins the first action, res judicata could not be applied as a
result of losing any subsequent action. 22  After this action, the
parties are in the same position as they would be in without the
Bernhard rule. And if the defendant loses the first action, it might
well be argued that the result would be merely to equalize the
bargaining position of the parties as to the terms of a possible
19 See, e.g., Currier & Moore, supra note 6, at 309. It should be noted that this argu-
ment is directed more against any abandonment of mutuality, not merely abandonment
of mutuality when res judicata is sought to be asserted offensively.
20 For example, in Wiener v. United Airlines trial on the issue of negligence alone
consumed eight days of pre-trial conference and sixty-nine days of actual trial time.
216 F. Supp. at 730. By contrast, each of the twenty-four separate claims in that
action was tried separately on the issue of damages and although the actual trial
time is not given, all were completed within three months. Wiener v. United Air
Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
21 This of course follows naturally from the application of the Bernhard rule.
The remaining plaintiffs would be able to establish the defendant's liability by virtue
of the first judgment leaving only the question of damages to be litigated.
22 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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settlement, resulting in a more equitable compensation for the
plaintiff's injuries.23
Although there seems to be no compelling reason for restricting
the Bernhard rule to defensive use, it is clear that the problems
posed require that the doctrine be limited in its application. The
basic requirements of the Bernhard test must be met.24 Particularly,
the issue must be clearly defined as the same in both actions. Also
it must be clear that the prior verdict was a final judgment on the
merits, consent judgments or default judgments not being con-
clusive.25 In addition to the Bernhard requirements, there should
be no estoppel if there has been an actual inconsistency of verdicts
in prior actions on this issue.26  Further, before applying res
judicata, the courts should consider the controversy in the prior
action and determine whether the defendant had sufficient reason
to defend to the utmost. Otherwise, the defendant might be re-
quired to defend a minor claim to an extent out of proportion to the
damages involved, in order to prevent the verdict from binding
him on an issue when a disproportionate amount is sought in later
actions.27
There must be some method of protecting against irregularities
in the first action. Of particular concern is the possibility that the
23 Undoubtedly, in many cases, prior to an actual determination of liability, the
defendant has a stronger bargaining position due to the uncertainty surrounding
litigation and an often stronger economic position. This could result in a settlement
which would not fully recompense the injured party. However, once liability is
determined, the plaintiff can offset this bargaining power with the prior judgment
assuring him of compensation.
214 Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
25 Under the traditional rules of res judicata, there is a conflict as to whether a
consent judgment or default judgment is conclusive as to the issues presented by the
claim. According to the "majority rule," consent judgments and default judgments
are conclusive as to all issues necessarily present in the claim. See, e.g., Riehle v.
Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929); Hay v. Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446, 109 So. 617 (1926).
28 See text accompanying note 16 supra, on the multiple plaintiff problem.
27 In the present case, the court noted that in the prior action, the total amount of
liability had been $2,337,308.51. 216 F. Supp. at 730. Obviously, disparity in amounts
at stake was not an issue. However, this problem represents one of the most difficult
stumbling blocks for the Bernhard doctrine. Some commentators have dismissed it
summarily, but as a practical matter the problem is real. See Comment, 35 YALE L.J.
607 (1926). The classical illustration is the minor claim for property damage, insti-
tuted in a municipal court, followed by an action for personal injury seeking much
greater damages. This problem prompted the California Court of Appeals in Nevarov
v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), to declare that
as the public policy of that jurisdiction, res judicata would not be available to non-
parties in the multiple claimant situation. The California Supreme Court however
has yet to rule on that question.
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first jury might have rendered a compromise verdict.28  Similarly,
there may be other defects which would indicate that no bona fide
determination of the issue was made. There is no set formula
which can dispose of these objections; rather, the courts must be
willing to examine subjectively the prior verdict and determine
whether it represents a full and fair adjudication of the issue.29
The present case illustrates that this approach can be successfully
and beneficially applied.30
This subjective approach may leave one less than satisfied. Final
solution of the problems raised by the multi-victim disaster probably
lies in improved devices for transfer and consolidation of actions, 3'
in which case res judicata would become secondary. However,
until such time as these devices are perfected, res judicata will
continue to be an important tool in the reduction of litigation and
the Bernhard rule can be profitably utilized.
-1 The California courts, after examining the prior action, have apparently declined
to allow res judicata in several cases because a compromise verdict was suspected.
See Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 806 P.2d 797 (1957); Leipert v. Honold, 39
Cal. 2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952).
20 Professor Currie, in his article, supra note 6, at 308, suggested as a possible limita-
tion on the Bernhard rule that it be used only against the party who had the initiative
in the prior action. The purpose of this limitation would be to protect the parties
from harassment and to some degree insure the fairness of the preceding action.
The theory is that if the party had had the initiative, it would be more probable
that the issue had been fully and fairly litigated as to him. However, if the court
is willing to examine subjectively the prior action for fairness, such a limitation is
not necessary and if applied would unduly restrict the principle because res judicata
could then be used only against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
30 In addition to the previously noted factors of amount involved and time spent
in litigation, the court in the instant case commented on several other factors which
are persuasive. Among these are: quality of counsel for defense, thoroughness of
the previous litigation, and the admission of defense counsel that no new evidence
on the issue of negligence would be forthcoming. 216 F. Supp. at 730-31. These
factors are all indicative of the fact that the defendant had had a full and fair
adjudication of the issue.
31 For examples of existing transfer and consolidation devices see 62 Stat. 937, 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1948) (U.S. transfer statute) and FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (a) (federal rule
on consolidation of actions). For state statutes on consolidation of actions, see, e.g.,
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1048; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 175 (Smith-Hurd 1956);
23 OHio Rav. CODE § 2309.64 (Page 1954).
Another device for simplifying procedures when many actions arise from the
same issue is by assigning one district judge to hear all such cases which are brought
within a particular circuit. 62 Stat. 901 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. 292 (b) (1958).
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